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ABSTRACT 
 
The United States (U.S.) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently 
excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. 
Except for materials that remain in use for programs outside of national defense, including 
programs for nuclear-energy development, the surplus inventories will be stored safely by the 
Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for 
permanent disposition. Some items will be disposed as transuranic waste, low-level waste, or spent 
fuel. The remaining surplus plutonium will be managed through: (1) the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel 
Fabrication Facility (FFF), to be constructed at the Savannah River Site (SRS), where the plutonium 
will be converted to fuel that will be irradiated in civilian power reactors and later disposed to a 
high-level waste (HLW) repository as spent fuel; (2) the SRS H-Area facilities, by dissolving and 
transfer to HLW systems, also for disposal to the repository; or (3) alternative immobilization tech-
niques that would provide durable and secure disposal. 
 
From the beginning of the U.S. program for surplus plutonium disposition, DOE has sponsored 
research to characterize the surplus materials and to judge their suitability for planned disposition 
options. Because many of the items are stored without extensive analyses of their current chemical 
content, the characterization involves three interacting components: laboratory sample analysis, if 
available; non-destructive assay data; and rigorous evaluation of records for the processing history 
for items and inventory groups. This information is collected from subject-matter experts at  inven-
tory sites and from materials stabilization and surveillance programs, in cooperation with the design 
agencies for the disposition facilities. This report describes the operation and status of the charac-
terization program. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. began a program to provide permanent disposal for a 
large stockpile of special nuclear material (including plutonium and highly enriched uranium). In 
1994, 38.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium was declared to be permanently excess to national 
defense weapons programs. Another 14.3 MT of government-owned, non-weapons-grade material 
was included in the disposition program. The ultimate disposition for these materials is a geologic 
high-level waste repository. 
 
In 2007, the U.S. declared an additional 9.0 MT of plutonium excess to national defense. A multi-
program partnership within the DOE, including the National Nuclear Security Administration, is 
engaged in managing, stabilizing, storing, and providing permanent disposition for this 61.5 MT. 
 
Disposition of excess material is also important to achieving a transformation of the facilities and 
sites that previously produced, processed, and recycled materials for weapons and for other pro-
grammatic uses. The DOE will continue to reduce the number of facilities required for the storage 
of plutonium under high safeguards, further improving proliferation resistance and reducing costs. 
 
Multiple pathways are available for disposition of excess plutonium, depending on the character of 
the existing inventories. These include: 
 
• disposal as high-level waste to a geologic repository, for plutonium contained in irradiated 
reactor fuel and targets; 
• disposal as transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), for low-grade process 
residues or scrap; or 
• retention and use in development and implementation of advanced nuclear fuel cycles. 
 
However, most of the bulk, high-assay plutonium is unsuitable for any of these pathways. The larg-
est fraction of the excess plutonium is contained in core components from retired nuclear weapons, 
typically called "pits." About 13 MT is found in non-pit inventories that supported previous pro-
duction processes. In January 2000, DOE announced a plan to dispose of up to 50 MT of plutonium 
using three primary facilities, to be built at SRS:1 
 
• a Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), to prepare plutonium materials for dispo-
sition in the MOX FFF; 
• a Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, to convert plutonium oxide from the PDCF; combine 
it with uranium oxide; and fabricate fuel for irradiation in commercial power reactors; and  
• a Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP), to convert the remaining non-pit materials into a 
durable solid, encasing the solid in high-level radioactive waste for disposal. 
 
The properties of pits and the requirements for civilian fuel are relatively straightforward. There-
fore, the early characterization programs focused on the varied materials proposed for PIP. 
 
In 2002, the PIP was cancelled so that the U.S. could provide greater attention to the PDCF and 
MOX FFF programs. These facilities were a cornerstone of a 2000 disposition agreement with the 
Russian Federation, where each Nation would provide disposition for 34 MT of weapons-grade 
material.2 Studies proceeded to identify alternative pathways for the disposition of the nominal 13 
MT of plutonium that would have been disposed through Immobilization. The U.S. developed a 
"three-prong" approach, which includes these elements:3 
 
• modifying the MOX FFF to accept Alternate Feedstocks (AFS), from sources outside the 
PDCF, including impure weapons-grade oxides; 
• dissolving selected inventories in H-Canyon and HB-Line at SRS, with plutonium disposed 
through existing HLW systems; and 
• implementation a smaller Immobilization concept, based on vitrification technology, that 
would provide disposition for the very impure materials that are not suitable for the other 
pathways. 
 
In 2006, DOE announced plans to extend the operation of the H-Canyon and HB-Line processes 
from 2012 through 2019. This extension allowed DOE to consider whether the MOX FFF and H-
Area options could be extended further, perhaps allowing for the disposition of the targeted 13 MT 
solely by a "two-prong" approach. Characterization activities shifted to the development of flow-
sheets and evaluation of intermediate steps that would allow this approach to succeed. 
 
Even before formal decisions are made on disposition strategies and facilities, DOE programs con-
tinued to stabilize plutonium for interim storage and to evaluate the inventories for compatibility 
with proposed disposition pathways. Figure 1 shows the processes that have been the subject of 
detailed study. 
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Figure 1. Primary Pathways Evaluated for Plutonium Disposition 
 
Early characterization and evaluation was led by the Immobilization development program at 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), while later work has been managed by Nonpro-
liferation Programs at SRS. All activities are coordinated with subject-matter experts from the sites 
where the plutonium was produced, processed, stored, or stabilized. Primary sites of origin for the 
disposition plutonium are the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS), SRS, Hanford 
Reservation, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and LLNL. 
 
REQUIREMENTS FOR DISPOSITION FEEDS 
 
The MOX FFF includes an Aqueous Polishing process to prepare its oxide feeds for fuel fabrica-
tion. Originally the process was required to remove americium, gallium, and minor impurities from 
oxides produced in PDCF. After the Immobilization project was cancelled, the MOX FFF devel-
oped specification limits for the chemical, physical, and isotopic characteristics of less-pure AFS. 
 
Surplus plutonium that does not meet the MOX FFF feed requirements is evaluated for alternative 
disposition, including the Vitrification process or disposal through the SRS H-Area facilities. Items 
that may not be compatible with the MOX FFF range from highly pure non-weapons-grade material 
to very impure alloys and mixed oxides (with plutonium isotopic contents ranging from weapons-
grade to reactor-grade). 
 
CHARACTERIZATION OF INVENTORIES FOR FEED TO MOX FFF 
 
Detailed laboratory analyses are not available for the bulk of the surplus inventories. The tools 
available for characterization include: 
 
• Process knowledge: The history of the material is inferred from the inventory groupings used 
by the site that produced or processed the material, including Item Description Codes used at 
RFETS and similar groupings at other sites. Table 1 shows the primary broad categories for 
evaluation, based on process knowledge and supplemental data (when available). 
 
C Pyrochemical Oxides. The oxides contain high chloride and with Mg/Na ratios less than 1 and Na/Cl 
ratios between 0.125 and 0.4. The most commonly used salt was an equal molar mixture of NaCl and 
KCl, but sometimes with up to 30 mole percent MgCl2. Materials in RFETS IDCs 086 and 067 are 
assumed pyrochemical unless ratios indicate otherwise. 
X Foundry Oxides: These oxides may or may not contain chlorine (>500 ppm) and generally have a ratio 
of Mg/Na>1 and a Na/Cl ratio, outside the range for group C above. Typical IDCs include 057, 061, 
and 062.  
D These oxides have chloride but low sodium levels with a ratio of Na/Cl generally less than 0.125. This 
may indicate the presence of Mg or Ca at higher levels.  
W The oxides were originally from Group C but were washed to remove excess chlorides prior to 
calcination.  
A These oxides are fairly pure and were produced by oxalate or peroxide precipitation of plutonium. 
M The oxides were precipitated using magnesium hydroxide. 
U The oxides contain more than 2% uranium and were processed with uranium streams using either 
aqueous or pyrochemical operations. Typical IDCs include U61 and Y61. 
H These materials are oxides and residues produced as a byproduct of plutonium processing to an oxide 
or metal form for production purposes. Often they contain fluoride. Materials which do not easily fit 
into the other categories are classified as Group H. 
S Screening materials include oxides materials that did not pass through screening operations, heels from 
dissolving operations, or sweepings. The items have a high potential for contamination with gallium, 
tantalum, aluminum, or corrosion products.  
Table 1. Primary Inventory Categories for Disposition Feed Evaluation 
 
• Laboratory analyses: Chemical data from an inventory group can be used to predict the 
distribution of impurities for other members of the group. Key information includes historical 
site data and samples from the Materials Identification and Surveillance (MIS) program that 
supports the DOE Standard for Long-Term Plutonium Storage (DOE-STD-3013).4 Additional 
data were gathered by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for items stored at Han-
ford, including groups of items that originated at RFETS.5 
 
Fewer than 400 complete analyses are available for approximately 5300 DOE-STD-3013 
containers that comprise the 13 MT of surplus, non-pit plutonium. However, the large major-
ity of the packaged items fall into one of the inventory groups and have similar likelihood for 
the presence of chemical impurities. Table 2 shows the current coverage of these groups or 
combined groups by detailed laboratory analyses. 
 
• Stabilization analyses: Data on actinide content, net weights, and processing history were 
reported as part of the documentation of stabilization to DOE-STD-3013. 
 
 
 
 Inventory Category 
Source of Sample Data C,W D,X A U H M,S 
DOE-STD-3013 MIS Database 5 12 4 4  5 
PNNL Evaluation 10  2  6  
Standards for International Atomic Energy Agency  6     
Historical RFETS & Hanford Analyses 13  31    
Los Alamos Oxide from Aqueous Processing   27    
RFETS Metals 4 276     
Table 2. Chemical Sample Analysis Availability 
 
• Non-destructive assay (NDA): External data are available from packaged oxides and many 
packaged metals. Of particular importance is Prompt Gamma Analysis (PGA), which can 
measure or detect concentrations of certain elements that are important to both the MOX FFF 
and alternative disposition processes.6 
 
Sites performed PGA following stabilization to DOE-STD-3013. PGA measures the produc-
tion of gamma rays, mostly from light elements, when those elements are activated by the 
decay of plutonium and americium. Figure 2 shows a typical spectrum. In addition to the ele-
ments shown, PGA is effective in identifying aluminum, beryllium, and magnesium. Detec-
tion limits for 60-minute counting times range from less than 100 parts per million (ppm) for 
sodium and beryllium to 7000 ppm for chlorine. 
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Figure 2. Prompt Gamma Analysis Spectrum 
 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Together with the process history, stabilization data on total impurity content, laboratory data, and 
NDA, it is possible to predict the distribution of unmeasured impurities. Within each category, 
many elements show a strong correlation with the total impurity content or a combined relationship 
that takes into account the total impurities and fluorine (if present). Other elements are less strongly 
correlated, and their concentrations are estimated from the total weight fraction of unidentified im-
purities in items proposed for feed to disposition. Figure 3 shows an example plot for chromium. 
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Figure 3. Correlation of Chromium Measurements 
 
Statistical methods may not be able to verify the concentration of a specific impurity in a single 
inventory item. However, they can predict the average and bounding concentrations that are 
expected within the inventory group. For disposition processes, these parameters are often more 
important than the concentrations in individual items. MOX FFF feed specifications are based on 
impurity distributions: "Most" items (nominally 75%) must fall below an elemental limit, and a 
"maximum exceptional content" is applied to 98% of the proposed feed inventory. Table 3 shows 
the results of the statistical analysis for a subset of 2200 impure Alternate Feedstock items, for ele-
ments that correlate with total impurity measurements and fluorine. 
 
 Specification Predicted Percentage of Items Below Statistical 
Element for 75% of Stated Concentration (µg/g Pu) Correlation 
 Feed Items 98% 75% 50% Mean Coefficient 
Aluminum 4,000 20.000 1,850 500 820 0.73 
Chromium 3,000 13,250 1,700 500 1,050 0.90 
Copper 500 5,600 450 110 220 0.78 
Iron 5,000 38,000 5,000 1,750 3,000 0.87 
Manganese 1,000 2,100 180 50 90 0.79 
Molybdenum 100 2,200 180 50 80 0.76 
Nickel 5,000 18,250 1,800 450 1,030 0.86 
Silicon 5,000 16,500 1,850 600 970 0.79 
Lead 200 1,270 90 50 116 0.64 
Tungsten 4,000 5,500 330 80 130 0.67 
Zinc 1,000 4,600 280 80 120 0.69 
Table 3. Statistical Projections of Impurities in Impure Plutonium Oxide Feeds 
 
Other methods determine the distribution of concentrations of other elements, within specific 
inventory groups and over the complete inventory of disposition feeds. Separate criteria are used to 
measure isotopic content and the presence of actinide impurities that could affect the quality of fab-
ricated fuel. Using these tools, more than 4 MT of current oxide materials was verified as suitable 
AFS feed to the MOX FFF. Table 4 shows the approximate distribution of oxide items that are 
judged to be suitable for the MOX FFF as AFS, versus non-qualifying items. 
 
MOX Suitable (AFS) Oxides           
Category A C D H M U W X S Overall 
% in Category 4.2% 24.5% 3.4% 1.3% 5.7% 17.9% 0.4% 42.6%  100.0%
%  with Low Chloride 71.4% 0.0% 0.0% 38.5% 91.1% 89.3% 0.0% 81.3%  59.3%
Average Impurity Level 2.6% 17.9% 13.4% 5.4% 2.7% 3.8% 16.8% 5.3%  8.8%
Non-MOX Suitable Oxides    
Category A C D H M U W X S Overall 
% in Category 16.2% 10.5% 1.7% 9.3% 4.1% 34.4% 1.3% 14.0% 8.4% 100.0%
%  with Low Chloride 70.9% 0.0% 0.0% 15.9% 84.0" 65.1% 12.5% 54.4% 12.7% 47.7%
Average Impurity Level 5.1% 28.5% 26.3% 27.4% 19.6% 9.2% 40.7% 18.0% 31.4% 22.0%
Table 4. Distribution of MOX FFF and Non-Qualifying Oxides by Process Category 
 
EVALUATION FOR OTHER DISPOSITION OPTIONS 
 
Once items are characterized for potential feed to MOX FFF, the same methods are used to estimate 
the chemical composition of proposed feeds for processing in the SRS H-Area or for Vitrification. 
Different elements can be important for process design and flowsheet development. 
 
One new category that is proposed for MOX FFF, identified in Figure 1, are materials that do not 
currently meet the MOX FFF specifications but that can be converted to meet those specifications 
without reprocessing. Up to 4 MT of additional AFS can be produced at SRS by oxidation of 
metals, repackaging, further calcination, or removal of excess halides through a washing process. 
Potential changes to the chemical or isotopic specifications may allow additional items to qualify as 
AFS. Work continues to establish equipment requirements and process flowsheets that may allow 
DOE to pursue the "two-prong" approach to disposition by using H-Area for all items that are not 
suitable for the MOX FFF cycle. 
 
FUTURE WORK 
 
Considerable feed characterization is possible through a combination of process history tracking, 
statistical analysis, and limited measurements. Additional "hard" data would add confidence to 
process plans. Process throughputs and operating plans can be estimated less conservatively if more 
measurements can supplement calculated or inferred compositions. 
 
Further measurements will be taken during the stabilization of additional items at LANL and LLNL, 
during the conversion and repackaging of items at SRS, and from the Destructive Evaluation of 
selected items for the DOE-STD-3013 surveillance program. Recharacterization is in progress to 
take advantage of recent PGA data and to develop correlations for new disposition pathways. 
 
The characterization methods described above focus on the chemical nature of the impure surplus 
plutonium. Separate studies continue for the isotopic and chemical composition of pit feeds to 
PDCF and for other oxides to be produced from pits. 
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